




CURSO FORMACIÓN PARA LOADING MASTER



Foro Marítimo Internacional de Compañías Petroleras



OCIMF


La Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) es una asociación voluntaria de compañías petroleras que tienen interés en el manejo y transporte de crudo y sus derivados tanto a bordo de los buques como en los terminales. Actualmente está comprendida por 111 compañías a nivel mundial.

Antecedentes Históricos

- Incidente del B/T Torrey Canyon en 1967.
- Iniciativas nacionales, regionales e internacionales en el año 1970 dirigidas a la prevención de la contaminación marítima las cuales fueron poco satisfactorias.
- Creación del OCIMF en Abril de 1970. Organización elevada a Organismo Consultivo de la OMI en 1971.




¿Cómo comienza OCIMF?



Torrey Canyon – Sur de Inglaterra – Marzo 1967

120.000 Tons.

¿Cómo comienza OCIMF?



Amoco Cadiz – Costas de Bretaña – Marzo 1978
223.000 Tons.

Ciclo de desastres de 11 años


1967 – Torrey Canyon

1978 – Amoco Cadiz

1989 -



¿Cómo comienza OCIMF?



Exxon Valdez – Alaska – Marzo 1989
37.000 Tons.

Hay más...

Erika
Bahía de Viscaya
Dic. 1999



Diciembre de 1999 – Erika



Percepción pública de los buques tanques



Medios de Comuniación



www.lloydslist.com SATURDAY FEBRUARY 12 2000/ 170h No: 57,499

Tanker Safety

France sets Erika agenda

Andrew Spurrier ■ Paris

FRANCE has taken the lead in introducing tough new standards as a first step in its drive for tighter European rules.

"Totaline and BP of France and the French subsidiary of BP, Shell and Esso have committed themselves to the measures as signatories of a voluntary tanker shipping safety charter sponsored by the French government, promising to introduce tighter checks on tankers aged 15 years and over and to ensure compliance with results from 2006."

"The charter, conceived as a voluntary shipping sector response to the Erika disaster, was presented by French transport minister Jean-Claude Gayssot after a five-hour meeting of his ministry."

"It is vital the shipping world commit at the same time as the government on an international and on a bilateral basis to these measures," says Gayssot. "What inspectors, charterers and oil firms find, it is important, here is what we have decided to do."

Oil price at post-Gulf high
Page 2

All in a day's dock work for Derek Birke, the mayor of Southampton
Page 7

The dictator for a day whose judgment saved WK
Page 8

Vodafone and the storming of Fortress Germany
Page 9

Week in View: Events and the people who made the news
Pages 12-13



Erika: the system's weakest link

One way you know that a tanker is out of the ordinary: after the normal period of coverage and calls for action has passed, the insurance for change actually keeps increasing rather than dying away.

This is the case with the Erika. Now that the shipping industry has taken on board the fact that it is not business as usual, its constituent interests are scrambling to prove that they have reform proposals to table.

We have said before that we may have to accept the classification societies' self-serving but probably correct assessment that only they can do the job of setting and ensuring certain standards are met. They have the experience, expertise and the records. However whether as currently organised, they are up to the job, has to be seriously questioned and that is what this photo-feature is about.

The great weak link in the system is the classification society's surveyor and his vulnerability to pressure or corruptible industry. The photographs on these pages were provided to us by the London Shipping Consultancy, LSC offers a service to banks needing the reassurance over the real state and value of ships they are financing that comes from a thorough physical inspection. In extreme circumstances they will arrest, take over and manage ships on which the bank is foreclosing.

By definition, these ships are therefore in the hands of financially distressed owners. Nevertheless the fundamental point is that they are all in class with IACS members as was Erika, are all but one showing serious breaches of class rules – in some cases just after special survey.

While six ships in a universe of 60,000 tells you nothing of statistical significance, they, and there are plenty more like them, do illustrate our point about the



containers would be sitting on unsecured hatch covers.



This is a Singapore flag container feeder vessel built in 1977. Picture 1 shows a surveyor peeling off a corroded eye.

The eyes are on-deck container hatch covers were able. The net of

The after-shock of the Erika is already rippling around Europe. The handover is slowly rolling and people are queuing up to hop on. So why is the loss of, and pollution from, this 36,000 dwt product tanker producing a substantially greater effect than the Braer, the Sea Empress or the Aegean Sea which also polluted European waters? Quite simply because it's different.

First, the ship broke up at sea, encouraging accusations of poor hull condition. Human error and mechanical failure, causes of previous European tanker casualties, appear to figure less prominently. Second, the cargo was residual fueloil rather than crude oil – more toxic, more viscous when unheated, with little or no evaporation and slower breakdown.

Third, the extent of the exposure and involvement of the tanker's voyage charterer, TotalFina, has been unprecedented – how many people inside the tanker industry, let alone outside it, can rattle off

The Erika disaster is having more effect on the tanker industry than the Braer, Sea Empress and Aegean Sea put together writes Bill Box.

the name of the charterer of the Braer, the Aegean Sea, the Sea Empress? Fourth, the fact that the incident occurred off TotalFina's homeland France, whose government is keen to score political points with an irate population.

That fourfold combination means this accident is perceived as the last straw, giving it the potential to be the Exxon Valdez of Europe.


The most obvious, immediate and dramatic effect of the Erika can be seen on charterer behaviour. Products tankers provide the clearest illustration. Charterers have been paying a massive W45 premium (that's roughly 33% extra) for modern over old products tankers in the Med and NW European spot markets. Why? Up to now, charterers have not had to pay significantly more for modern tonnage compared to the older units that scrape through oilco vetting on an "acceptable but not preferred" basis. This has driven modern products tankers elsewhere – Carls, Far East, Australia, US – where quality tonnage is valued. Post Erika, demand for modern tonnage has suddenly increased, but supply is short, boosting rates.

"Why is it that Europe is prepared to accept the lowest quality standard in the world when it comes to shipping oil?" asks one products tanker operator. A good question, particularly when most of the charterers who regularly take older, borderline tankers are Europe-based and are taking the risk, if anything goes wrong, of a big mess right on their own doorstep.

The answer is that perhaps it won't be prepared to for long. Some European charterers and terminal operators are already talking a max 20 years rule (one French terminal is insisting on max 15 years).

"The immediate effect of these restrictions, combined with flag and class limitations, has been to strengthen the Atlantic market for both Aframax and million barrel tonnage. If and when these restrictions become the industry norm there will be a significant change in the whole market structure," warns London broker EA Gibson.

But more crucial to the tanker industry's long-term future is the political bandwidth getting underway in Europe. The French government has been suggesting French charterers might charter only national flag tankers less than 15 years old. Europe's transport commissioner Loyola de Palacio has been heading down the road towards phasing out single-hull tankers in line with the US OPA90 other than Marpol; towards tougher port state control and tougher classification technical inspection; towards increasing responsibility on the cargo owners for oil spill compensation.




Erika – catalyst for change

France

Jospin turns screw in ship safety crusade

Andrew Spurrier ■



ERIKA DISASTER

THE broken hull of the Erika has become the emblem of a crusade led by France for improving safety standards in the shipping industry, and urged EU member states to ratify relevant International Labour Conventions. It would also seek to have employment inspection procedures strengthened and harmonised.

He confirmed that the government would be looking for tougher port state controls and more frequent and more rigorous flag state inspections for vessels 15 years old or more.

But he added that there was also a need to "control the controllers" via a European structure to oversee port state and flag state inspectors and class societies. France also intends to urge the IMO give itself a real capacity for supervision of controls, to ensure that all its member states were fulfilling their obligations.

Following the undertaking given last week by the French oil sector not to use single hull tankers after 2008, France will press its EU partners to ban single hull tankers from EU ports from 2008 on.

Mr Jospin added, however, that he wanted a timetable set for applying the ban to bigger vessels from 2005 on.

Crews were not forgotten.

"We must also improve the working conditions of crews, for to promote social justice is also to contribute to ship safety," Mr Jospin said.



ERIKA DISASTER

"We will invite our European partners – with whom we can act on more than 90% of traffic off our coasts – to take together strong initiatives within the IMO," he said.

He confirmed that France would be looking for ships to be made to signal their arrival in Europe's 200-mile exclusive economic zone as a medium to long-term objective but indicated that he wanted to see the system introduced on a voluntary basis much earlier.

He also announced measures to tighten up surveillance of ships carrying dangerous or polluting products.

France wants to see all ships in this category obliged to signal their arrival in the territorial waters of



ERIKA DISASTER

all EU states and to give precise information about themselves.

Subsequently, they would be obliged to obtain prior authorisation before entering EU ports – an authorisation which would itself be conditional on their being able to present "a detailed dossier" covering their own condition, crewing arrangements, and insurance and other regulatory requirements.

Assuming that they were finally authorised to berth, such ships would be subjected to a thorough inspection before being allowed to proceed with loading or unloading operations.

France is also to ask the IMO on its own account to oblige all vessels entering the Channel, whether they pass in national or international waters, to signal their presence to a French surveillance centre off the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy.

Following the undertaking given last week by the French oil sector not to use single hull tankers after 2008, France will press its EU partners to ban single hull tankers from EU ports from 2008 on.

Mr Jospin added, however, that he wanted a timetable set for applying the ban to bigger vessels from 2005 on.

Crews were not forgotten.

"We must also improve the working conditions of crews, for to promote social justice is also to contribute to ship safety," Mr Jospin said.



ERIKA DISASTER

France would press the European Commission to produce proposals for the harmonisation of social conditions in the shipping sector, and urged EU member states to ratify relevant International Labour Conventions. It would also seek to have employment inspection procedures strengthened and harmonised.

He confirmed that the government would be looking for tougher port state controls and more frequent and more rigorous flag state inspections for vessels 15 years old or more.


But he added that there was also a need to "control the controllers" via a European structure to oversee port state and flag state inspectors and class societies. France also intends to urge the IMO give itself a real capacity for supervision of controls, to ensure that all its member states were fulfilling their obligations.

Following the undertaking given last week by the French oil sector not to use single hull tankers after 2008, France will press its EU partners to ban single hull tankers from EU ports from 2008 on.

Mr Jospin added, however, that he wanted a timetable set for applying the ban to bigger vessels from 2005 on.

Crews were not forgotten.

"We must also improve the working conditions of crews, for to promote social justice is also to contribute to ship safety," Mr Jospin said.



ERIKA DISASTER

France would press the European Commission to produce proposals for the harmonisation of social conditions in the shipping sector, and urged EU member states to ratify relevant International Labour Conventions. It would also seek to have employment inspection procedures strengthened and harmonised.

He confirmed that the government would be looking for tougher port state controls and more frequent and more rigorous flag state inspections for vessels 15 years old or more.

But he added that there was also a need to "control the controllers" via a European structure to oversee port state and flag state inspectors and class societies. France also intends to urge the IMO give itself a real capacity for supervision of controls, to ensure that all its member states were fulfilling their obligations.

Following the undertaking given last week by the French oil sector not to use single hull tankers after 2008, France will press its EU partners to ban single hull tankers from EU ports from 2008 on.

Mr Jospin added, however, that he wanted a timetable set for applying the ban to bigger vessels from 2005 on.

Crews were not forgotten.

"We must also improve the working conditions of crews, for to promote social justice is also to contribute to ship safety," Mr Jospin said.



ERIKA DISASTER


SENTE DE GESTION DE LA CALIDAD

CONSEMAR GROUP ISO 9001 CERTIFIED

Y aun más....

Noviembre 2002... Prestige
Cargado con 76.000 Tons de Fueloil





El Incremento del riesgo

- En los años 1980's – Gran reducción de compañías petroleras armadoras de buques.
- Conocimiento y calidad de servicio reducidos.
- Falta de confianza en las Autoridades Estatutarias.
- Se incrementa el uso de Compañías de Gestión Marítima (Ship Management Companies).
- Se incrementa el uso de buques de terceras partes (fletados).


**“Un simple incidente de
contaminación puede
tener consecuencias
devastadoras aún a las
más grandes Compañías
Petroleras”**

Objetivos de la OCIMF


- Promocionar la seguridad y prevención de la contaminación de tanqueros y terminales.
- Coordinar los puntos de vista de la Industria Petrolera en la OMI.
- Revisar las propuestas técnicas circuladas por la OMI y asesorar a sus miembros sobre las actividades legislativas en la medida que se desarrollan.
- Producir directrices técnicas y operacionales bien por si misma o en asociación con otros organismos de la industria.

Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE)

- Se introduce en 1993.
- Es una herramienta **ÚNICA** de evaluación de riesgo que da valor agregado a los Fletadores, Compañías Navieras, Terminales Marítimos y Gobiernos de los Estados que estén interesados en la seguridad dentro de la Industria Marítima.
- Se incluyen inspecciones a barcas petroleras en el año 2004.



Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE)



- Los reportes de inspección son mantenidos en la base de datos por dos años.
- El acceso al SIRE está disponible a un costo nominal a aquellos miembros de la OCIMF y otras organizaciones interesadas.
- El acceso es libre de costo para los organismos gubernamentales vinculados con la industria marítima petrolera.

¿Que es una inspección VETTING?

- Sistema de inspecciones desarrollado originalmente por las Compañías Petroleras.
- Busca determinar si los buques que transportan hidrocarburos y sus derivados cumplen con los estándares de la Industria Marítima y Petrolera.
- Inspección física llevada a cabo en forma sistemática.




¿Qué taxi usaría Usted?



¿Que es una inspección VETTING?

***Vessels' Performance
Evaluation***



***Operación y Gestión
del Buque***



Areas del buque que son inspeccionadas



CERTIFICACIÓN Y
DOCUMENTACIÓN



GESTIÓN DE
TRIPULACIÓN



NAVEGACIÓN



GESTIÓN DE SEGURIDAD



PREVENCIÓN DE LA
CONTAMINACIÓN



PROTECCIÓN MARÍTIMA

Areas del buque que son inspeccionadas



OPERACIONES DE CARGA



AMARRE



COMPARTIMIENTOS DE
MÁQUINA Y SERVOMOTOR



CONDICIÓN Y
APARIENCIA GENERAL

La OCIMF en Números (Resumen 2020)

3 
PROGRAMMES
SIRE, OVID, MTIS

596 
SIRE
INSPECTORS

362 
OVID
INSPECTORS

1,851 
MTIS BERTHS
REGISTERED


838 
MTIS TERMINALS
REGISTERED

35
BOOKS


60
INFORMATION
PAPERS


OCIMF at the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
145 DAYS OF
MEETINGS
48 YEARS
CONSULTATIVE
STATUS


La OCIMF en Números (Resumen 2020)



50 YEARS OF OCIMF
1970 - 2020

Proceso de la Inspección Vetting



Proceso de la Inspección Vetting



Directrices y Recomendaciones


Joint CDI/OCIMF/INTERTANKO
guidelines and
precautions for conducting a
vessel inspection



Cadena de Responsabilidad en la Calidad y Seguridad de los Buques

- La OMI.
- Estados Pabellón (Bandera).
- Estado Rector del Puerto.
- Organizaciones Reconocidas incluyendo Sociedades.
- Clasificadoras actuando en su rol de Estado Pabellón.
- Sociedades Clasificadoras actuando en su rol tradicional.
- Gestores Navales (Operadores Marítimos / Técnicos).
 - **NAVEGABILIDAD DEL BUQUE**
- Roles del CDI & OCIMF.

The Regulators



But some sub-standard vessels still escape the net



*The majority of the world's fleets are safely operated.
A significant minority is not.*

Gestión del Riesgo



- *¿Por qué se realiza?*
- *¿De qué se trata?*
- *¿Cómo se realiza?*

¿Qué razones hay para actuar con calidad y seguridad?

- Opinión Pública.
- Presión política.
- Responsabilidad financiera.
- Realidades comerciales.
- Incidencia de siniestros.
- Conocimiento reducido de la condición actual del buque.
- Falta de confianza en la regulaciones / políticas oficiales.

¿Quién evalúa el riesgo en la industria marítima petrolera?


- Equipos de Evaluación de Riesgo
 - ✓ (Vetting Departments)
- Sistema computarizado automatizado

¿Cómo evalúan las compañías petroleras?

- Toda petrolera tiene su propio esquema de aseguramiento de la calidad.
- Los esquemas varían en función al tamaño de la Compañía, alcance y diversidad de las actividades, uso de información real y calidad del análisis.
- Los reportes SIRE son una buena fuente de información. Estos pueden ser descargados de la base de datos de OCIMF.
- La determinación de la utilización (o no) del buque está solo a discreción de la compañía petrolera.
- Uso de AUTO-VETTING.



Other Vetting Considerations



Categorización del Riesgo en la Industria Marítima

Buques operados por su propio Armador

- Gran control
- Menos riesgo

Buques fletados por tiempo

- Riesgo intermedio

Buques fletados en el “Spot Market”

- Mas viajes
- Grandes riesgos
- Menor calidad por parte del fletador

¿Dónde están los riesgos?


- La Gente (Factor Humano).
- Los Procedimientos.
- El Equipo.
- La estructura.



Evidencias de Condiciones Inseguras y Deficiencias



Evidencias de Condiciones Inseguras y Deficiencias



Evidencias de Condiciones Inseguras y Deficiencias



Evidencias de Condiciones Inseguras y Deficiencias



Importancia de las Inspecciones Vetting

- Herramienta de suma utilidad para la toma de decisiones de los departamentos de fletamento de las Compañías Navieras.
- Se busca de que formen parte de la CULTURA ORGANIZACIONAL de las Compañías Petroleras.
- Los Departamentos de Vetting de las Compañías Petroleras deben contar con un nivel de autoridad y responsabilidad suficiente en el proceso de la toma de decisiones, que incluso puedan atender los proyectos y planes de maniobras emergentes, que puedan incidir en mejoras para la flota segura y para las operaciones marítimas.

Importancia de las Inspecciones Vetting

- Los resultados de las inspecciones vetting bien analizados pueden generar Planes de Acciones Correctivas que concienzudamente implementados contribuyen en gran medida a la mejora continua de la Seguridad Marítima.
- Las aprobaciones de reportes de inspección por parte de las Compañías Petroleras son un aval comercial al momento de ofrecer un buque para ser fletado. ***SI NO HAY REPORTES APROBADOS PUEDE PERDERSE LA OPORTUNIDAD DE UN FLETE.***

Importancia de las Inspecciones Vetting

- El conocido lema “Seguridad Primero” debe constituirse en baluarte de los procesos de control de calidad y seguridad de las Compañías Petroleras.
- Las normas y criterios de aceptación de tanqueros de las Compañías Petroleras debe ser garante de los procesos de evaluación técnica de sus respectivas flotas y los procesos evaluados deben acatarse por la seguridad de la industria.


Preguntas de Reflexión

- ¿Tiene la terminal implantado un procedimiento para garantizar que los buques aceptados para hacer escala en el terminal cumplen con los estándares mínimos de seguridad como está establecido por la instalación o la compañía ha establecido un sistema de aceptación de buques “vetting”?
- ¿Existe un procedimiento documentado e implantado para notificar a los terminales si un buque es encontrado estar subestándar al arribo?
- ¿La terminal tiene el derecho a rechazar buques nominados, siempre que esta tiene basamento justificable para hacer eso?
- ¿La terminal provee información retroactiva sobre el desempeño de los buques o las deficiencias al punto focal del sistema de aceptación?

ISGOTT

International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals

CURSO DE FORMACIÓN DE LOADING MASTERS



Contenido de la ISGOTT

- ***PART I: General Information***
- ***PART II: Tanker Information***
- ***PARTE III: Marine Terminal Information***
- ***PARTE IV: Ship/Shore (Tanker/Terminal) Interface***

ISGOTT – Part I General Information

- ***Chapt. 1 Basic properties and hazards of petroleum.***
- ***Chapt. 2 Gas evolution and measurement.***
- ***Chapt. 3 Static electricity.***
- ***Chapt. 4 Managing hazards and risks for ship and terminal.***
- ***Chapt. 5 Fire protection.***
- ***Chapt. 6 Security.***
- ***Chapt. 7 Human factors.***
- ***Chapt. 8 Alternative and emerging technologies.***

ISGOTT – Part II General Information

- ***Chapt. 9 Management of safety and emergencies.***
- ***Chapt. 10 Enclosed spaces.***
- ***Chapt. 11 Shipboard systems.***
- ***Chapt. 12 Shipbaord operations.***
- ***Chapt. 13 Carrying and storing hazardous materials.***
- ***Chapt. 14 Special ship types.***

ISGOTT – Part III Marine Terminal Information

- ***Chapt. 15 Marine terminal information.***
- ***Chapt. 16 Marine terminal operations.***
- ***Chapt. 17 Marine terminal system and equipment.***
- ***Chapt. 18 Cargo Transfer equipment.***
- ***Chapt. 19 Marine terminal fire protection.***
- ***Chapt. 20 Emergency preparedness and evacuation.***

ISGOTT – Part IV General Information

- ***Chapt. 21 Communications.***
- ***Chapt. 22 Mooring and berthing.***
- ***Chapt. 23 Tanker and terminal.***
- ***Chapt. 24 Bunkering operations.***
- ***Chapt. 25 Ship to Shore Safety Check List (SSSCL).***



Primera Academia Marítima Online de Latinoamérica



Consemar Group Venezuela (Head Oficce)



Torre Johnson & Johnson, Piso 4, Ofic. C, Av. Rómulo Gallegos
Urb. Los Dos Caminos, Caracas.



+58 212 2975589 / 2394065



+58 424 2439115 / 414 1236250



CONSEMAR GROUP C.A. - Venezuela
gerop@consemargroup.com.ve



CONSEMAR GROUP EUROPE / Valencia – España
europe@consemargroup.com



CONSEMAR GROUP PANAMÁ S.A.
managerpanama@consemargroup.com



CONSEMAR GROUP Inc. – HOUSTON, TEXAS, USA
consemar_usa@consemargroup.com